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)
)
)
)

Case No. 19068

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case in which defendant was charged
by Information with Attempted Theft By Receiving and Carrying a
Concealed Dangerous Weapon.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Jury found defendant not guilty of the charge of
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, but returned a verdict of
guilty of the charge of Attempted Theft By Receiving.

Based

thereon, the court entered its Judgment and Sentence on February 7,
1983.

- 2 RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment and an order
directing the District Court to dismiss the charge of Attempted
Theft By Receiving brought against him in this action.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant and his co-defendant, Earl Cushing, were
jointly charged by Information with Attempted Theft By Receiving,
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title
76-6-408.

The appellant was also charged in a Second Count with

the crime of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-10-504.

The

court granted defendant Cushing's Motion for Acquittal at the close
of the evidence at the trial, and the case was submitted to the Jury
on the two charges pending against Mr. Powell.

A verdict of not

guilty was returned on the weapons charge, but the Jury found him
guilty on the charge of Attempted Theft By Receiving.
For purposes of this action, the parties have entered into
a Stipulation of Facts which reads as follows:
1. On April 12, 1982, the defendant was charged by
Amended Information with the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving,
a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title
76-6-408, in that said defendant did attempt to receive, retain or
dispose of the property of Jack Hales knowing that it had been stolen,
or believing that it probably had been stolen, with a purpose to
deprive the owner thereof. (R.56)
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2. On or about May 19, 1982, defendant filed his Motion
To Quash and Dismiss Count I of the Amended Information (dealing
with the charge of attempted theft by receiving) on the ground that
the acts of the defendant did not constitute the offense of Attempted
Theft By Receiving because one of the essential elements of the crime,
that of attempting to receive stolen property, was not present when
the alleged offense occurred. That motion was denied by the court. (R.61:
3. At the conclusion of the State's case, and at the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the defendant made
oral motions for acquittal on grounds that the State had failed to
establish one of the essential elements of the crime, that of attempting to receive stolen property. Those motions were denied by the court.
4. The stolen property referred to in the Amended Information consisted of two horses that were sold to the defendant on
October 20, 1981, by Charles P. Illsley, an undercover police officer
employed by West Valley City.
5. The horses that were sold to the defendant by Officer
Illsley were not stolen.
They were owned by Jack Hales, who loaned
them to the West Valley City Police Department on October 20, 1981,
for the purpose of making the transaction with the defendant.
6. At the outset of the trial, the attorney for the State of
Utah conceded that the horses were not stolen, and testimony throughout
the trial consistently showed that the horses were never stolen.
7. The trial judge refused the defendant's request that the
jury be instructed that one of the essential elements of the crime is
that the property must be stolen when it is received by the defendant.
(R.163) Instead, the trial judge instructed the jury that one of the
elements of the crime is that defendant did receive or retain the
horses believing that they probably had been stolen. (R.114)
8. The jury found the defendant guilty of the charge of
Attempted Theft By
and Judgment on the verdict was entered
by the court on February 7, 1983. (R.184-5)

I:

I
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1/

II

9. The sole issue to be determined by the Supreme Court
on appeal is whether the subject property (horses in this case)
must actually be stolen before the defendant can properly be convicted of the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-6-408.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF ATTEMPTED
THEFT BY RECEIVING AND IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED
EVEN THOUGH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY HAS
NOT ACTUALLY BEEN STOLEN.
The charges against the defendant arose out of a "sting"
operation conducted by the West Valley City Police Department.
Defendant was arrested when he purchased two horses from the undercover
office who negotiated the transaction.

The horses had never been

stolen, they had just been borrowed by the officer for use during the
"sting" operation.

Defendantwas subsequently charged with Attempted

Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated, Title 76-6-408.

In pre-trial motions and throughout the

trial, defendant's attorney repeatedly moved to dismiss the action on
grounds that one of the essential elements of the crime, that of
attempting to receive stolen property, was not present when the alleged
offense occurred.

The court consistently held that the subject propertv

need not be of stolen character before defendant could be convicted of
the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving.

The trial judge instructed
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the Jury that if one receives or retains property of another believing that it probably has been stolen, the offense is committed even
though the property has not, in fact, been stolen.

Based on previous

Utah cases, the defendant asserts on this Appeal that the trial judge
erroneously instructed the Jury and improperly refused to dismiss
the case.
The issue on this Appeal is the same as that raised by the
defendant in the trial court.

The court must answer the question of

whether the property received by the defendant (horses in this case)
must actually be stolen before defendant can properly be convicted of
the crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving, in violation of the charging
statute.
The relevant portion of Utah Code Annotated, Title 76-6-408,
which is the charging statute in this instance, reads as follows:
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY--DUTIES OF PAWNBROKERS.-- (1) A
person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals,
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any such property from the owner, knowing the property to
be stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
The above statute was amended into its present form when the
revised Utah Criminal Code was adopted in 1973.

This court has pre-

viously considered at least three cases which deal with the present
language of the statute.

The most recent of these is State v. Murphy,

- 6 617 P.2d 399.

In that case the Supreme Court of Utah reversed

defendant's conviction under the statute because the prosecution
had failed to prove an unlawful purpose at the time of defendant's
possession of the alleged stolen vehicle.

In discussing the elements

of the crime, the court stated as follows:
"Implicit in the language of the statute are the basic
elements of the crime: (1) property belonging to another
has been stolen; (2) the defendant received, retained or
disposed of the stolen property; (3) at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property the defendant
knew or believed the property was stolen; and (4) the
defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the
possession of the property.
Before the defendant can be convicted of the crime of
receiving stolen property the prosecution must present
a quantum of evidence sufficient to establish each element
of the crime."
In a footnote referring to element number (1), the court
stated, "This requirement is fundamental to the offense."
Another case decided by this court which involved the
receiving statute is State of Utah v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (1980).
In that case the court was dealing with the charge of concealing or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property, but the principles
laid down by the court apply to all cases arising under the statute.
After quoting the language of the statute, as we have done above,
the court listed the elements of the crime as follows:
"(l) property belonging to another has been stolen;
(2) the defendant aided in concealing this property;
(3) at the time he so aided in concealing it he knew
the item had been stolen; and (4) his purpose in acting
was to deprive the owner thereof of possession. For a
criminal conviction, the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt each element of the crime."

- 7 It appears that this court has twice stated that one
of the essential elements of the crime of receiving stolen property
is that the property belonging to another has been stolen.

The

entire basis for the offense, historically and fundamentally, is
that the property actually be stolen.

The purpose of the statute

is to apprehend those having stolen property in their possession
where no evidence exists as to the identity of the actual thief.
There is no basis in law or in fact for the conviction of persons
who purchase property that is not stolen.

The language of the

statute that states "or believing that it probably has been stolen,"
refers only to the requirement of knowledge on the part of the
accused that the property was stolen.

It disposes of the defense of

the accused that he did not know that the property was stolen and
makes him equally culpable if he believes that the property was
stolen.

This language does not change the basic requirement that the

property be in fact stolen before he can be convicted of the theft
charge.
On this issue, the Utah cases are not unlike the holdings
of other States.

In 66 Am. Jur.2d, Receiving Stolen Property, §7,

Page 298, we find the following general language pertaining to this
issue.

It reads as follows:

"An essential element of the offense of receiving stolen
property is that the property received must be stolen
property. A previous theft of the property, with all the
elements of that offense, must affirmatively appear, and
if it does not, or if the fact appears that the property
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was not stolen, as where the original taking from the
owner was without felonious intent or was not against
his will or consent, the receiver is not guilty of
receiving stolen property. Similarly, if at the time
of the alleged offense the property, although previously
stolen, has lost its stolen character through a recovery
by the owner or otherwise, the receiver cannot be held
guilty, even though he receives it believing it to be
stolen property. Pursuant to these principles, it is a
defense to a charge of receiving stolen property that the
property was offered to the accused with the consent of
the owner for the purpose of entrapment."
Since the horses that were sold to Mr. Powell were admittedly
not stolen, but were the rightful property of Mr. Jack Hales, who
loaned them to the police for the purpose of selling them to Mr. Powell,
one of the essential elements of the crime is missing, and the trial
court should have dismissed the action or should have granted the
defendant's Motion for Acquittal.
The third case that has been decided by the Utah court since
the Theft By Receiving statute was amended is State of Utah v. Sommers,
569 P.2d 1110.

The prosecution and the court erroneously relied upon

this case to support the rulings made during the trial.
In Sommers, the defendant claimed that the receiving statute
violated the due process clause of the Constitution because the
statute, under the law of Attempt, negated the defense of impossibility.
He argued that when the statute precludes the defense of impossibility,
then the right of fundamental fairness implied in the due process clause
has been done away with.

The court rejected the Constitutional defense

of impossibility, relying upon outside authority.

Then, in line with
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the rejection of the defense of impossibility, the court stated as
follows:
"Thus
exculpate defendant solely on the ground the
television set he purchased was not, in fact, stolen
property would shock the coomon sense of justice. The
defense of impossibility is not a fundamental right
essential to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.
The express abolition of such a defense advances the
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
support all of our civil and political institutions.
Defendant's assertion that he was convicted of the crime
of conjuring up malevolent thoughts is without merit.
His conviction was predicated on proof of his criminal
purpose implemented by an overt act strongly corroborative
of such prupose."
The above statement by the court refers to the defense of
impossibility and not about the
Receiving.

of the crime of Theft By

No issue as to the elements of the crime was discussed

or resolved in the Sommers case.
The editors of West Publishing Company made a critical error
in preparing the headnotes for the Sommers case.

They indicated that

the court had made a determination on the stolen property question by
including the following headnote:
"Fact that television set purchased by defendant from
undercover agent was not stolen property did not preclude
defendant from being convicted of attempt to receive
stolen property.
U.C.A. 1953, 76-4-101(3)(b)."
Unfortunately, the language of the headnote does not correctly reflect the language and holding of the court.

The only thing the

court decided in that case was that the defense of impossibility was
not available to the defendant under the circumstances of the case.

- 10 The law of some of our surrounding states is similar to
that laid down in the Lamm and Murphy cases.

The Supreme Court

of our neighboring State of Nevada has also adopted the principle
that the first element of a charge involving stolen property is
that the property must, in fact, have been stolen.

In affirming a

conviction for possession of a stolen camera, the court in Dutton v.
State, 581 P.2d 856 (Nevada 1978), stated:
"In order to sustain a conviction for possession of stolen
property the State must show: (1) the property was in fact
stolen, (2) the property was possessed by the accused with
knowledge that it was stolen at the time of possession, and
(3) the property was possessed by him with the feloneous
intent of depriving the true owner of the property."
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of Billings v.
State, 650 P.2d 917 (Okla. Appeals 1982):
"In a prosection for receiving stolen property, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the property
was in fact stolen; (2) that the accused was in possession
of the stolen property; (3) that the defendant had actual
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the property
was stolen . . . the state adequately showed, through direct
evidence, that the truck was stolen and that Billings [the
defendant] was found in possession of it."
This same principle was followed in Lohman v. State, 632
P.2d 430 (Okla. Appeals 1981) where the court affirmed a conviction
for receiving stolen cattle.

In the court's language, " . . . all that

need be shmm is that the property is in fact stolen, that the accused
took possession of the stolen property, and that he knew or should
have known that the property was stolen."
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It is obvious thdt one of the basic elements of the
crime of Attempted Theft By Receiving was missing in the case
now before the court.

The horses that were purchased by Mr. Powell

during the "sting" operation conducted by the West Valley City
Police Department were admittedly not stolen.

Therefore, the court

should have dismissed the case before it came to trial.

In failing

to grant Motions to Dismiss and Motions of Acquittal and instructing
the Jury that the offense could be collllllitted even though the property
was not actually stolen, the court collllllitted serious error which
should be corrected by this court on Appeal.

The court should reverse

the judgment of the District Judge and should remand the case to the
District Court for illllllediate dismissal of the charges.
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth herein, the court should reverse the
Judgment of the District Court and should order the dismissal of the
case.
DATED

P'!t...

of May, 1983.
RESPECTFULLY SUBlUTTED,

.?!

.

J .

ucU,.",_,_

H. RALPH
MM
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

- 12 -

On

!)

t'i

NOTICE OF SERVICE

day of May, 1983, true copies of the foregoing

Brief of Appellant were delivered to the following:
Office of Salt Lake County Attorney
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney General, State of Utah
State Capitol Building, Room 236
Salt Lake City, Utah

")

·' cf _/?

Aant

l.-/>---

